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Abstract 
 Rather than appealing to penal parsimony as a constraint on the otherwise insatiable demands of 
the criminal justice system, we should develop a positive account of the proper aims of criminal law 
which shows parsimony, or moderation, to be integral to those aims. We can do this by developing a 
republican conception of criminal law as a law that citizens impose on themselves: such a law will be 
modest in its scope, and will provide a criminal process of trial and punishment that addresses those 
subjected to it with the respect due to them as citizens.  
 
Key words 
• Penal parsimony, moderation, republicanism, citizenship, criminal law 
 
 
Introduction 
 ‘Reinventing penal parsimony’ is an admirable but incomplete aspiration. It is admirable 
because we must seek ways of constraining the apparently inexhaustible appetite for penal 
harshness in Britain and the United States, but also because parsimony should be a feature of 
any normative theory of criminal law. Even a decent system of criminal law will be coercive, 
burdensome and (since it is human) liable to be oppressive; its ambitions must be modest, its 
operations constrained by a recognition of the harm it can do and of the costs (material and 
moral) it incurs. However, this aspiration is incomplete, since to make ‘parsimony’ our sole 
aim would set penal theorizing in a narrowly negative frame. We would seek ways to limit 
penality, to constrain criminal law, to resist temptations to overcriminalize (see Husak 2007); 
but this could distract us from the equally important task of discerning the positive aims that 
criminal law should serve. If we think that an abolitionism which seeks to abolish criminal 
law altogether offers the only plausible route towards a decent polity; or if we see criminal 
law as expressing a pre-rational urge to punish, which we can constrain but cannot eliminate 
(Playfair 1971): we need not seek a positive theory of criminal law, and can wield a principle 
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of penal parsimony as the best way to limit the harm done by criminal law while it survives. 
But if criminal law has a legitimate role in a civilised polity, we need a positive account of its 
proper aims, which the principle of parsimony cannot offer. I will argue that a desirable penal 
parsimony is best secured by explaining parsimony not as a distinct principle, but as an aspect 
of those proper aims. Following Loader’s (2010) suggestion, we should aspire not to penal 
parsimony, but to penal moderation: whereas ‘parsimony’ implies a single-minded concern to 
reduce (which is why it can have pejorative connotations of meanness), ‘moderation’ implies 
a concern to find the appropriate mean between extravagance and meanness.  
 I turn to that argument in Sections 2-3. First, however, I should say something about the 
aspects of the problem of penal extravagance that especially concern me here. 
 
1. Aspects of Overcriminalization 
 We punish too many people, too harshly and destructively. Much of this undue harshness 
flows from what happens to offenders after conviction (leaving aside the harms done by the 
criminal process itself): too many are subjected to modes of punishment that are, in effect if 
not by design, inhuman, oppressive, and unduly severe. But it also flows from what happens 
earlier—from the overcriminalization that infects our criminal law (see Husak 2007), given 
which too many people who should not be criminally liable come to be convicted of offences. 
 In its simplest form, overcriminalization is a matter of criminalizing types of conduct that 
should not concern the criminal law: that is why it was right to decriminalize blasphemy, for 
instance (Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008), and why we should decriminalize the 
use of many currently prohibited drugs (see Husak 2002). But overcriminalization comes in 
other, subtler forms than that. 
 As far as substantive criminal law is concerned, two phenomena are noteworthy. One is 
the addition of criminal offences to non-criminal legislation. Many of the 1,750 new offences  
since 1997 are of this kind: a statute specifies certain requirements, and makes it an offence 
to fail to meet them. The other is the creation of an ever wider range of ‘ancillary’ offences 
(Abrams 1989), criminalizing conduct that might contribute to the commission of a primary 
offence or hinder its prevention or detection. Terrorist legislation illustrates this phenomenon. 
For example, the Terrorism Act 2000 criminalizes failures to give the police information that 
might assist the prevention or prosecution of terrorist offences (s. 38A); the possession of ‘an 
article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion’ of terrorist purposes (s. 
57); and the collection or possession of ‘information of a kind likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism’ (s. 58). 
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 These offences sometimes include provisions spanning substance and procedure that also 
expand the scope of the criminal law: they turn what one might expect to be an element of the 
offence, which the prosecution must prove, into a matter of defence that the defendant must 
prove. Thus though s. 57 is headed ‘Possession for Terrorist Purposes’, the prosecution need 
prove no such purpose; if it proves that the possession gave ‘rise to a reasonable suspicion’ of 
terrorist purposes, the onus shifts onto the defendant to ‘prove’ that his possession was not for 
any such purpose.2 It might be argued that, unlike offences that impose strict liability,3 such 
burden-shifting provisions do not expand the law’s scope; they merely alter the procedure by 
which guilt is proved. That might be true when the defendant’s burden is merely evidentiary, 
so long as the bar for evidentiary sufficiency is quite low: but it is not true when the burden is 
persuasive,4 since an innocent defendant might be unable to produce evidence to prove her 
innocence; and the over-enthusiastic shifting even of evidentiary burdens still involves penal 
excess, since it requires citizens to answer in a criminal court for wholly innocent conduct, on 
pain of conviction and punishment if they cannot offer an exculpatory answer.5 
 We should therefore be alert to ways in which the criminal law’s grasp can be extended, 
often without adequate justification, not only by criminalizing types of conduct remote from 
the primary mischief at which the law is aimed, but also by weakening the fault requirements 
in offences, or by shifting probative burdens from prosecution to defence. Penal extravagance 
is a feature not just of our sentencing laws and practices, or of our penal institutions, but also 
of the substantive criminal law. The (re)invention of penal parsimony should involve not just 
reform of sentencing and punishment, but a re-examination of the scope and structure of the 
substantive criminal law, so that its ambitions remain within suitably modest bounds. 
 However, not all expansion of the criminal law constitutes overcriminalization; not all 
reductions in its scope mark a welcome penal parsimony. Not only might there be currently 
non-criminal wrongs that we should criminalize; one way to ‘decriminalize’ conduct is to 
subject it to non-criminal regulation that is as burdensome as the criminal law, but lacks the 
protection that criminal law gives defendants. One example is the use of ‘preventive orders’ 
to control supposedly dangerous individuals without convicting them (see Ashworth and 
Zedner 2008, 2010): given that alternative, we should prefer criminalization, which requires 
public proof of determinate wrongdoing before liberty is curtailed, and subjects any such 
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curtailment to requirements of proportionality. Another example is the use of non-punitive 
‘measures’. The Netherlands, for instance, was long seen as a beacon of penal parsimony—
with rates of imprisonment and sentence lengths well below those in the UK and the USA 
(but see Downes and Van Swaaningen 2007); but beside the range of formal punishments 
there exists a range of compulsory ‘measures’, including ‘placement in an institution for 
persistent offenders’, which (not being punishments) are not constrained by any requirement 
of retrospective proportionality.6 But just as we might prefer criminalization to other modes 
of regulation, so we might prefer criminal punishment to other kinds of ‘measure’; we might 
do better to try to reform criminal law and punishment, rather than replacing them by other 
techniques of control or prevention.7 
 None of this is to suggest that penal parsimony is not a worthy aspiration. It does suggest, 
however, that we need a clearer account of what criminal law and punishment can properly 
do and be if we are to understand whether, when and why they should be preferred to these or 
other alternatives: we need not merely a negative, constraining principle of penal parsimony, 
but an account of the positive justifying aims of a system of criminal law. 
 
2. How Best to Pursue Penal Parsimony 
 There are two grounds on which we might find our current systems of criminal justice to 
be punitively extravagant. First, we might think that even if they are pursuing legitimate 
aims, the means used are often, even if effective, inconsistent with other values. Of course it 
is a proper task for the state to reduce the harms that crime causes, or to protect security,8 and 
criminal law can serve those goals. Our use of it should, however, be constrained not only by 
the demand that it be used efficiently, but by other values, such as proportionality; current 
penal practices pay insufficient attention to those other values. Or we might, second, find a 
more fundamental fault in our current criminal law—that it is not now pursuing the aims that 
criminal law ought to pursue: what is amiss is not just the means used in pursuit of legitimate 
ends, but the ends themselves. 
 These two kinds of criticism reflect two familiar models of penal theorising; the second, I 
will argue, offers a more appropriate grounding for penal parsimony. 
 The first kind of criticism fits with a familiar model of normative theory (see Hart 1968). 
We begin with a ‘general justifying aim’ for a system of criminal law, which gives us 
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positive reason to create such a system. We realise, however, that the unconstrained pursuit 
of that aim would violate other important values: not only would it conflict with other goals; 
it would violate normative demands that are naturally expressed in terms not of goods to be 
achieved, but of wrongs not to be committed. Perhaps the justifying aim of criminal law is to 
reduce those kinds of harm whose incidence can be affected by proscribing (or prescribing) 
certain kinds of human conduct; a system of criminal law is justified only if it is an efficient 
means to that end. But demands of justice also set categorical side-constraints on the means 
we may use in pursuit of our goal—the right of the innocent not to be punished, for instance, 
or the right of the guilty not to be punished more harshly than they deserve;9 we must not 
pursue the justifying aim by means that violate such side-constraints. On this view what is 
wrong with current penal practice might be not that it is pursuing the wrong ends, but that in 
pursuit of legitimate goals it violates side-constraints of justice that it should respect. 
 This kind of model usually involves a consequentialist end, consisting in some benefit to 
which criminal law is an efficient means, and a set of non-consequentialist side-constraints. It 
is a tempting model, which seems to do justice to two kinds of moral demand that most of us 
recognise: the demand to pursue consequential goods, and the demand that we refrain from 
actions that are intrinsically wrong. If ours is a normatively plural world, of consequentialist 
and non-consequentialist values, this type of theory allows us to fit both kinds of value into a 
coherent whole. Some versions of retributivism, however, also fit this model. Moore argues, 
for instance (1997, 33-5), that the function of criminal law is ‘to attain retributive justice’, by 
punishing culpable moral wrongdoers. Now we cannot plausibly talk of a categorical duty to 
punish all culpable wrongdoers; the most we can say is that this is one significant good that 
the state should try to achieve through a system of criminal law. That good is internal to the 
system, rather than a further consequence; but it plays the same role as do consequentialists’ 
further goods, and can ground an account of criminal law of the same form as that displayed 
in side-constrained consequentialism: we should pursue the goal of punishing all and only the 
culpably guilty, but must respect side-constraints which limit the scope of the criminal law by 
appealing to other values (Moore 1997, ch. 16; 2009, 31-3). 
 Whatever goal is posited, however, whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic to the criminal law, 
such theories are inherently unstable (see Goldman 1979; Lacey 1988, 46-56). It is hard to 
believe that the side-constraints of justice are absolute: that we must refrain from injustice, 
although the heavens fall. If the heavens would fall, if we face an emergency, the demands of 
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justice might be overridden by the demand that we avert disaster. But once we recognise that 
emergencies can force us to violate the demands of justice, we might be tempted to discern 
emergencies too enthusiastically: in a ‘war’ against terrorism, or drugs, or crime, we might 
have to compromise some of what will then seem to be the niceties of justice—niceties that 
must be respected in times of stable peace, but cannot be fully protected in an emergency. 
 Penal parsimony can be portrayed as a side-constraint: in pursuit of the ends that criminal 
law should serve, we must be frugal in our use of its coercive means. Admittedly parsimony 
was for Bentham, as for any consequentialist, also integral to the end: the aim of criminal law 
is the efficient, i.e. parsimonious, pursuit of the relevant goods. That kind of parsimony is, 
however, insufficient, since consequentialist ends might be efficiently pursued by excessively 
harsh or coercive means. So we might posit a principle of parsimony as a further check on 
consequentialist penality: we should restrain the scope and rigours of the criminal law, even 
at the cost of some loss of efficiency in our pursuit of its aims. Parsimony, like other side-
constraints, then draws its force not from within the criminal law’s aims, but from outside it: 
it is therefore vulnerable to the same kind of over-riding in times of (perceived) emergency. 
 Of course, the fact that a theory makes normative life uncomfortable is not an objection 
to the theory. Perhaps that is how the normative world is—a site of fundamental normative 
conflicts, where we face dilemmas that we cannot coherently resolve;10 a normative theory of 
any human institution must reflect that messiness, and force us to face those conflicts. If we 
fear that we may be tempted to discern emergencies too quickly, the proper remedy is not to 
look for another theory, but to find ways to strengthen our moral will and perspicacity. But if 
there was a more stable kind of theory, which did not make penal policy vulnerable to hijack 
by perceived emergencies, that would be something in its favour. 
 We can reach the same point by a different route. Braithwaite and Pettit talk of the need 
to posit a ‘satiable’ goal for criminal law, which motivates ‘respect for uncontroversial limits’ 
on the law’s powers, and does ‘not make voracious demands’ that threaten those limits (1990, 
45). Familiar consequentialist goals, such as crime prevention, are ‘inherently insatiable: for 
however much we do, ‘there will always be more that can in principle be achieved’; but we 
could achieve that more only by transgressing such ‘uncontroversial limits’ as refraining from 
punishing known innocents (1990, 46).11 We can constrain that insatiability by setting side-
constraints on our pursuit of the goal; but this produces an unstable theory whose constraints 
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are liable to be overwhelmed by the perceived urgency of the end. If, however, we can posit a 
satiable end, we can generate a more stable theory. 
 It might seem that while consequentialist theories are inherently insatiable (because they 
take the end to justify any efficient means), retributivist theories are not: it could not further 
retributive justice to punish a known innocent. But if we interpret retributivism as positing a 
good to be achieved, it too can be insatiable. Consider again Moore’s retributivism, according 
to which criminal law aims to punish culpable moral wrongdoers. There is no lack of such 
wrongdoers in the world; however many we punish, there are more out there; there is no end 
to the pursuit of that end. That is why Moore (1997, ch. 16) appeals to other values, extrinsic 
to the proper aims of criminal law, to produce a tolerable account of its legitimate scope. 
 Braithwaite and Pettit claim to posit a satiable consequentialist goal for criminal law: that 
of ‘dominion’. It is not clear that they are right: just as a large enough gain in the goods that 
other consequentialist theories posit could mandate policies which violate ‘uncontroversial 
limits’, so a large enough gain in the dominion of the many could justify invasions of the 
dominion of the few that violate such limits. Instead of pursuing this issue, however, I will 
sketch an alternative satiable goal for criminal law. The key point, as Braithwaite and Pettit 
see, is to posit a goal that is moderate in ambition: one that does not even tempt us towards 
excess in its pursuit. We can then make parsimony, understood now as moderation, internal 
to the criminal law, rather than having to control the criminal law by constraints based in 
external values. Two examples might make this point clearer. 
 First, contrast Moore’s account of criminal law with another that takes wrongdoing to be 
its proper focus. For Moore, all wrongdoing is in principle the criminal law’s business. If we 
are to understand why such wrongs as marital infidelity, or betraying a friend’s confidence, 
should not be criminal, we must look not to the criminal law’s proper end (these are culpable 
wrongdoings that the criminal law should aim to punish), but to other principles, external to 
that end, which constrain its pursuit: for instance, to the ‘presumption of liberty’ (see Moore 
1997, 746-50). If, by contrast, we say that the criminal law is concerned only with ‘public’ 
wrongs, wrongs that are the business of all members of the polity (Marshall and Duff 1998), 
we can explain why in terms of the criminal law’s own aims, marital infidelity or betraying a 
friend’s confidence should not be criminal. The reason is not that, whilst we have reason to 
criminalise such wrongs, we have stronger reasons (extrinsic to the criminal law’s goals) not 
to do so; it is that we have no reason to criminalize them, since they are not public wrongs. 
Rather than picturing a system of law whose intrinsic aims would mandate the pursuit of all 
moral wrongs, we picture a system whose intrinsic aims are modest from the start. 
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 Second, consider the idea of ‘abuse of process’ in relation to the criminal trial. If we ask 
why courts should, for instance, exclude evidence that was obtained by torture; or bar the trial 
of someone who is present for trial only because he was repatriated illegally by state officials 
or with their connivance:12 one answer is that whilst it could still serve the ends of justice to 
admit such evidence or to try such a defendant, other extrinsic values which bear on the trial 
make it improper to admit the evidence or to continue the trial (for instance, the need to deter 
malpractice by state officials by making it unprofitable). But that would not capture the idea, 
which courts cite in such contexts, that it would be an ‘abuse of process’ to pursue a trial on 
the basis of such evidence, or when the defendant was brought to trial in this way; or that it 
would undermine the ‘integrity’ or ‘legitimacy’ of the trial.13 To call something an abuse of 
process is to say that a process is being put to an improper use, at odds with its proper aims; 
to say that something undermines the integrity or legitimacy of a process is to say that it is 
inconsistent with the proper ends, or intrinsic values, of that process. We must then ask more 
carefully just what the proper aims of the criminal trial are. If the aim is simply to establish 
whether the defendant is guilty and eligible for punishment, it can be served by admitting 
evidence acquired by torture, or trying an illegally repatriated defendant. But suppose that it 
is, rather, to do justice by calling alleged wrongdoers to account under the law: that process is 
vitiated by state action that blatantly violates the demands of justice and the law. A state that 
kidnaps (or connives in the kidnapping of) a defendant cannot claim to call him to account 
under the law that it violates. A state that uses (or connives in) torture to extract evidence 
cannot claim to be doing justice, or to be treating those involved in the criminal process with 
the respect that is due to them (see Duff et al. 2007, chs. 3, 8). 
 I have argued so far that if we treat a principle of parsimony merely as a constraint on the 
criminal law, restraining our use of coercive means in pursuit of the law’s legitimate goals, it 
will be vulnerable to demands flowing from the perceived urgency of those goals, especially 
in times of perceived emergency—just when it is most important. I have also suggested that 
we can find a securer basis for parsimony by portraying it not as a side-constraint, flowing 
from values external to the proper ends of the criminal law, but as integral to those ends: we 
can then avoid the conflicts between ends and constraints that bedevil the ‘side-constraint’ 
model—conflicts that the ends are always likely to win. We can now explore that possibility. 
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3. A Criminal Law for Citizens? 
 Normative theorising about criminal law typically starts with the aims of criminal law: 
what are its proper purposes? But there is a prior question: who is criminal law for? It might 
be addressed partly to courts (Dan-Cohen 1984; Alldridge 1990), but it is not addressed only 
to them: it speaks as well to those with whom the courts will deal.14 Before we ask what its 
aims are, we must therefore ask how it should portray those whom it claims to bind, and how 
it should speak to them. 
 A simple answer is that law claims to bind, and is addressed to, citizens. If we focus on 
domestic law, that answer seems unavoidable; it might indeed be a definitional truth—and 
thus unhelpful, since it shifts the question to that of what it is to be a citizen. That question 
must be answered through political theory: if we are to understand the criminal law, as a core 
institutions of the state, we must begin with an account of the state’ proper responsibilities 
and aims, and of its proper relationship to its citizens. 
 This is not the place to offer a full political theory. But to work towards a conception of a 
suitably modest criminal law, we can ask what citizenship can mean in contemporary polities 
that aspire to become liberal democracies.15 The best answer to that question is to be found in 
a republican theory that portrays citizenship, understood as equal and mutually respectful 
participation in the civic enterprise, as a central value (see e.g. Dagger 1997, Pettit 1999). 
 To give a little more substance to this slogan, we can contrast republican citizenship with 
two other kinds of status that theorists have ascribed to criminal law’s addressees. The first is 
that of subject. This is explicit in classical legal positivism: law consists in commands that the 
sovereign addresses to his subjects, who must obey the commands or face sanctions. It is also 
implicit in accounts that portray criminal law as a set of prohibitions, or as a technique for 
controlling behaviour: prohibitions, like commands, imply a distinction between those who 
prohibit and those who must obey; behaviour-controlling techniques are applied by would-be 
controllers to the population whom they would control. That might capture the sad reality of 
criminal law in many contemporary societies: the law is heard by many as a set of external 
demands which will coerce them if they do not obey. What that describes, however, is not the 
neutral reality of law, but a pathology—one way in which law goes wrong. For a republican, 
law must be our law as citizens, a ‘common’ law that we make for ourselves, not a law made 
for us and imposed on us by a sovereign; citizens must be able to understand themselves as 
authors as well as addressees of the law (see Cotterrell 1995, ch. 1l; Duff 2001, ch. 2.4). 
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 The second contrast is with the status of moral agent. Philosophers who look to moral 
rather than political philosophy sometimes portray citizens, in their dealings with the criminal 
law, simply as moral agents. That is implied, for instance, by Moore’s account. If the criminal 
law aims to punish morally culpable wrongdoers, it deals with us as moral agents; the fact 
that the wrong I commit in Scotland is dealt with by a Scottish court under Scots law, while 
the wrong that a Frenchman commits in France is dealt with by a French court under French 
law, is of secondary significance, reflecting an appropriate division of moral labour between 
different states. But this does not take citizenship seriously enough. Citizenship ties us, not to 
every other moral agent as such, but to the fellow members of a particular polity:16 it gives us 
a particular interest, not in every dimension of our fellows’ lives, but in those aspects that 
bear directly on the civic enterprise in which we are collectively engaged. Citizenship is a 
communitarian idea, of membership of a community engaged in a particular form of life: but 
communitarianism need not posit the kind of oppressively all-embracing community that its 
critics fear. For the civic enterprise is just one of many communities, one of many forms of 
life, that structure our lives: its scope and reach is limited, partly because a central feature of 
that form of life in a liberal republic is its emphasis on individual freedom and the privacy 
that it requires.17 
 Another aspect of republican citizenship is that it is inclusive and not easily lost. The law 
binds and protects all citizens equally; it speaks to them all in the same terms, whether they 
are law-abiding, or victims or perpetrators of crime. It does not protect ‘us’, the law-abiding, 
against ‘them’, the enemy; it is not a weapon in a ‘war’ against drugs, or terrorism, or crime. 
It is, rather, an expression of the values by which we define ourselves as a polity—values that 
we should all share.18 One who commits a crime does not thereby lose his civic status; he 
remains a citizen—albeit one whose wrongdoing his fellows must address. That is what is 
objectionable about the ‘civic death’ suffered by many convicted of felonies in the US, and 
about the UK government’s continuing failure to remedy the blanket removal of voting rights 
from prisoners:19 they deny citizenship when it should be reasserted. 
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 (Citizenship is not, of course, an unproblematic foundation for criminal law. First, there 
are important issues about how citizenship is gained, and about whether it can be forfeited. 
Second, how can a citizens’ criminal law address or deal with non-citizens who visit, or who 
are resident for shorter or longer periods in, the polity? There is clearly a real danger that a 
citizens’ law will be in various ways exclusionary rather than inclusionary: that citizenship 
will be made unreasonably hard to acquire, or will be too easily lost; that non-citizens will be 
denied the protection and respect that citizens can expect; that the polity will operate with a 
distinction between ‘citizen’ criminal law and ‘enemy’ criminal law—and will be too quick 
to classify some kinds of offender as ‘enemies’ rather than as ‘citizens’.20 I cannot discuss 
these problems here, save to note that liberal republicans will be sensitive to the import not 
only of citizenship, but of other normatively rich concepts such as fellow human being, and 
guest. They will therefore, first, need to ensure that citizenship is rather easy to gain and very 
difficult to lose; and second, accord to temporary visitors or residents the respect and concern 
that is due to guests who are both bound and protected by the values that define the polity.) 
 A first step towards a modest criminal law is to ask what kind of law republican citizens 
might create. To what kind of criminal law, and what kinds of punishment, might they subject 
themselves, consistently with a recognition of each other as citizens? However, before we can 
answer that question, we must ask what criminal law is, as a distinctive mode of regulation. 
Republicans, I suggest, should see criminal law as properly concerned with public wrongs—
wrongs that are the proper business of all citizens in virtue of their membership of the polity, 
because they violate the polity’s civic life, and the values that structure it. In its substantive 
dimension, criminal law defines a range of such wrongs; its procedural and penal dimensions 
provide for formal responses to the suspected commission of such wrongs, with the criminal 
trial and criminal punishment as the most dramatically visible of such responses.  
 The trial can now be seen as a process through which a citizen is called to answer, by her 
fellow citizens, to a charge of public wrongdoing, and to answer for that wrong if it is proved: 
part of the importance of such a process is that it treats defendants as citizens who are bound 
by the polity’s values and publicly accountable for their conduct.21As for the punishments to 
which those who are convicted are liable, we must ask not what kinds of punishment ‘we’ 
should impose on ‘them’, but what kinds of punishment we should impose on ourselves and 
our fellow citizens—and to what ends. I have argued (Duff 2001) that a plausible answer to 
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that question should emphasise not incapacitation or deterrence, but communication: an 
attempt to bring offenders to recognise the wrongs they have committed, and the need to 
make appropriate reparation for them. Punishments which serve that end will be modest in 
their severity, and civil in their modes. They must address offenders as citizens who are still 
members of the polity: the wrongs they have committed must be addressed (we do not respect 
our fellows by ignoring their wrongdoing), but in ways that preserve rather than deny the 
offender’s civic standing. Among the implications of this approach are that it will make little 
use of imprisonment, given both its material harshness and its exclusionary meaning; and that 
it will seek modes of punishment that can be seen (by offenders and others) as reparatory—as 
formally repairing offenders’ civic relationship with their fellow citizens. 
 Penal moderation—as to severity and mode of punishment, and as to the tones in which 
punishment addresses those who are punished—is thus integral to a republican criminal law. 
That moderation is not imposed as an extrinsic constraint on our pursuit of the proper aims of 
criminal law. Rather, it is an intrinsic dimension of a republican conception of crime and of 
those who commit crimes: the aims of republican criminal law cannot be served by harshly 
oppressive or exclusionary punishments. 
 A further kind of moderation is intrinsic to a republican criminal law: moderation in the 
law’s scope. To show that we have any reason to criminalize a type of conduct, we must first 
show that it constitutes a public wrong that concerns all members of the polity as impinging 
on the values that define the civic enterprise. We must also argue that it requires a criminal 
response—a response that makes its wrongfulness salient, and that involves calling anyone 
accused of committing such a wrong to answer to that charge on pain of condemnation and 
punishment if proved guilty; for that is what criminalizing a type of conduct involves. Two 
further aspects of criminalization are also important. First, it declares the wrong to be ‘public’ 
not just in the sense that it concerns us all, but in the sense that it is one with which we should 
deal collectively: we do not leave it to the victim to pursue (or not to pursue) the wrongdoer; 
the wrong, we insist, is ours as well as his. Second, the law’s declaration of wrongfulness is 
categorical, not negotiable. When the defendant is summoned to answer a charge, he can of 
course offer an exculpatory explanation for his commission of the offence; but it is not open 
to him to argue that what the law defines as an offence is not a public wrong.22 Wrongs which 
are to be criminalized must be wrongs which we can say must be publicly condemned, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 
 But it is crucial to the law’s legitimacy that there is another political forum where he can make that 
argument and seek to change the law. These features of criminal law are central to abolitionist objections 
that criminal law ‘imposes’ values and ‘steals’ ‘conflicts’: see Christie 1977; in response see Marshall and 
Duff 1998, 
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whose perpetrators must be called to public account; a liberal republic will be sparing in its 
declarations of such wrongs. 
 To say this is not yet to provide any substantive principles of criminalization; but surely 
we need such principles if we are to limit the scope of the criminal law. I fear, however, that 
the search for a set of master principles is doomed to failure, since candidate principles (when 
not so vague as to be vacuous) are either radically under-inclusive or vastly over-inclusive: 
they cannot do the work they are asked to do.23 Criminalization requires a more piecemeal 
process of public deliberation: what will limit the law’s scope is not some master principle(s), 
but the spirit in which such deliberation is conducted—as deliberation about what we can 
properly demand of each other as citizens on pain of formal condemnation and punishment.24  
 The spirit of that public deliberation must be informed by civic virtues such as pluralism, 
civic trust, and respect for responsible agency. That is, first, liberal republicans will realise 
that what strikes them as objectionably offensive or wrong might reflect a different, respect-
worthy conception of the good. They need not be neutral between all conceptions of the good 
—they can be perfectionists; but perfectionists can be pluralists.25 They will therefore be slow 
to criminalize conduct purely on the grounds that it is offensive to others, especially when it 
is wrong (if at all) only because it is offensive, rather than offensive because it is wrong.26 
 They will, second, take seriously the (defeasible but not easily defeated) presumption that 
others are to be trusted not to attack them.27 That is why their criminal law will normally be 
responsive rather than pre-emptive: they will be slow to create offences whose mischief lies 
not in what they actually do, but in what the conduct might lead to in the future—especially 
when such future mischief will depend on the conduct of others, and is not intended by the 
agent (see von Hirsch 1996). They will not criminalize the mere possession of material that 
gives rise even to a reasonable suspicion that it is possessed for terrorist purposes: for that is 
not yet a wrong for which the possessor should have to answer in a criminal court, on pain of 
conviction if he cannot adduce evidence that the possession was innocent.28 They will see 
reason to criminalize possession that is for terrorist purposes: for terrorist attacks are public 
                                                                                                                                                 
23  This is, notoriously, true of the harm principle (see e.g. Harcourt 1999; Stewart 2010; Duff 2007, ch. 6). 
24  For a sensible discussion of principles and policies that should figure in such deliberation, see Ashworth 
2009, chs. 2-3. 
25 
 See Raz 1986. Brown ([1993] 2 All ER 75) neatly illustrates this point: the key to understanding why their 
sadomasochistic activities should not be criminal lies not in an appeal to the supposedly wrong-dissolving 
power of consent, but in recognising alternative ways of finding mutually respectful fulfilment. 
26 
 See generally von Hirsch and Simester 2006. The paradigm of conduct that is offensive because it is wrong 
is the racist insult. 
27 
 Compare Floud and Young 1981, 44, on the ‘right to be presumed ... free of harmful intentions’. 
28  Terrorism Act 2000, s. 57; see text at n. 2 above. See more generally Dubber 2001. 
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wrongs, and preparations to commit public wrongs are themselves public wrongs. However, 
they will use even ‘possession with intent’ offences, and other precursor offences, sparingly, 
since they will see the importance of leaving each other room, as responsible agents, to turn 
back voluntarily from a criminal path. They will use the criminal law to respond to genuine 
wrongs that have been committed, rather than to prevent wrongs that are so far only potential 
or contemplated.29 
 However, third, republicans will not always be reductivist. They will sometimes see good 
reason to extend the criminal law to cover conduct that was not previously regulated at all, 
and will sometimes prefer criminal law to other possible modes of legal control. They will, 
for instance, see reason to use criminal law to deal with breaches of statutory requirements (if 
they are genuine wrongs, as breaches of regulations that serve the common good) rather than 
‘decriminalizing’ such breaches by redefining them as ‘administrative’ violations.30 They will 
avoid modes of preventive restraint that cannot be justified as deserved punishments for past 
wrongdoing,31 and will instead use criminal law to define relevant kinds of wrongdoing. The 
reason for this is again grounded in citizenship and responsible agency: the law should guide 
citizens’ conduct only by offering them relevant reasons for action, grounded in the polity’s 
good; it should subject them to its coercive attentions only when they fail to act in accordance 
with such reasons, and commit a public wrong; the proper response to such wrongs is to call 
those who commit them to account, as the criminal law does. 
 Restraint and moderation will still be features of a republican approach to criminal law, 
even when it sees reason to extend the criminal law: partly because the criminal process to 
which alleged offenders are subjected and the punishments to which offenders are liable must 
still treat them as citizens; and partly because, to the extent that the criminal law is likely to 
bear too oppressively on alleged and proved offenders, republicans will see good reasons on 
balance not to criminalize conduct that they had in principle good reason to criminalize. 
 
Conclusion 
 The penal moderation to which we should aspire is, I have argued, best grounded not in 
determinate principles by which we might hope to constrain the state’s pursuit of whatever its 
legitimate goals may be, but rather in a republican conception of criminal law to which a 
conception of citizenship is central. We should aspire to a criminal law that is apt for citizens: 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 
 See also Zedner 2007. These aspects of a republican approach to criminal law give clearer content to the 
idea of criminal law as a ‘last resort’: see Husak 2004; Jareborg 2005. 
30 
 See n. 9 above; Duff et al 2007, 189-98. 
31 
 See at n. 8 above. 
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one to which they can properly and without losing respect for themselves or for their fellow 
citizens subject themselves and each other. 
 Two final and less optimistic remarks are in order. First, since the achievement of such a 
criminal law depends on the inculcation and maintenance of the republican civic virtues that 
we noted above, it is (to put it mildly) a distant ideal; pending the day when criminal law can 
bring the goods that it ideally should bring, we also need to pursue a more negative principle 
of parsimony that seeks to limit the harm the criminal law can do. Second, there remain some 
serious questions about the conditions necessary for republican criminal law to survive: about 
the extent to which in which criminal law can deal with, or can be sustained, in various kinds 
of emergency; about the kinds of emergency that might make its (at least partial) suspension 
unavoidable. But these are not questions that we can pursue here. 
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